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In early December, the U.S. President hosted the leaders of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to sign a truce. He promised an end to decades of conflict in the volatile eastern DRC, presenting it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to unlock economic gains.

Not long after, however, a starkly different approach to conflict emerged. The administration announced that U.S. forces had carried out Christmas Day airstrikes in north-west Nigeria, striking sites connected to the Islamic State (IS). In a social media post, the President warned, I had cautioned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Clear Shift in Policy

This contrast encapsulates the core principle of the U.S. approach to sub-Saharan Africa in this period: a moving away from advocating for democracy and human rights in favor of a avowed focus on economic deals and conflict resolution—even as this aligns with the emerging military strikes in Nigeria is an open question.

“We no longer see Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a phrase we’ve seen thrown around for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” stated a high-ranking U.S. state department official during a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

An administration spokesperson stated this, saying the President “views Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations secure peace, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Strategic Results and Contradictions

This pivot is significant, but experts caution it is early to judge its results. The approach is complicated by the President’s unconventional diplomacy, which has included disputes with long-standing U.S. partners and negative rhetoric towards Africans.

“The organizing principle is, if it’s in the long-term or short-term interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” commented a scholar for Africa studies at a influential foreign policy council.

Key decisions have included:

• Dismantling the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. Research forecasts this could lead to millions of excess fatalities globally by 2030, with a significant portion in Africa.
• Imposing visa restrictions on citizens from numerous African countries and halting most refugee admissions.
• Starting a global tariff campaign that has adversely affected African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Allowing a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to lapse without renewal.

Diplomatic Disinterest and Tensions

Differing from his predecessors, the President avoided sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His best-known foray into African affairs was referring to nations on the continent with a crude epithet, which he later confirmed using.

“The continent ranks dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for the President, but for the administration in general,” remarked the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which allocated only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A notable dispute has erupted with South Africa, apparently influenced by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The claim of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa fits perfectly now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” noted a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Quid Pro Quo Engagement and Conditional Involvement

A comparable confrontation emerged with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This ran up against Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation composed between Christians and Muslims and plagued by security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts said that the forceful rhetoric may have pushed the government into more responsiveness on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had consented to the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

Trump has publicly expressed his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has mediated in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to negotiate a resolution in Sudan’s civil war, as yet without success. While the Congo deal was reportedly broken quickly, it “at least serves to introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” said one conflict expert.

A Resemblance to Rivals

Some analysts see the new U.S. approach as paralleling that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have deepened their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on commercial interests.

“It represents a belated recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” said one foreign policy analyst.

In practice, the revised strategy likely means that “a state that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The engagement that we are talking about does not seek to spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a transactional posture towards Africa,” she added.